Oral Betting No Violation Of Illinois Laws: Court Decision So Interprets; Judge Lindsay of the Criminal Court Sustains This Contention in Discharging Defendant Arrested at Hawthorne Last Year, Daily Racing Form, 1924-04-20


view raw text

ORAL BETTING NO VIOLATION _ OF ILLINOIS LAWS ■ «i m COURT DECISION SO INTERPRETS ♦ Judge Lindsay of the Criminal Court Sustains This Contention in Discharging Defendant Arrested at Hawthorne Last Year » All doubt as to Chicago racing was swept aside yesterday when Judge William J. Lindsay, sitting in the Criminal Court held that the so-called oral betting system as practiced in New York was not a violation of the Illinois anti-betting laws. His decision is as follows: The court in discussing the evidence made this statement: The prosecution in this case is based on Section 126, Chapter M of the statutes. The defendant is charged with gaming, making a bet for money or something of value. The evidence discloses that the the defendant, and a man named David Seymour, officers saw a man by the name of Lipsitz, alleged to be a bookmaker, in conversation and that Lipsitz handed to said Seymour a certain card, on its face a business card and on the reverse side thereof a certain memoran- Odum as follows: The name "Missouri Boy," apparently a race horse, entered in a race on the said date, July 12, as is evidenced by a program offered in evidence by the state, underlie ith the name "Missouri Boy" the figures 20-» and -. with a numeral one under each of said figures and the initials "J. L. L." The officers testified that no money was passed, nor any other conversation overheard, but thereupon the said Seymour and the said Lipsitz were both arrested at the Hawthorne race track. This court cannot presume from this evidence that the defendant in this case is the "J. L. L." nor that the figures contained on the said card represent money or anything of value, nor is this evidence of an illegal transaction. The card may hive represented some personal memorandum between the defendant and Seymour, but the court cannot presume this or anything else. And there is nothing in the evidence here to indicate that the horses were being run for the purpose of betting, nor that there was to be settlement between the defendant and Seymour for something of value conditioned upon the outcome i of said race. The fact that there was a horse "Missouri Boy" running on that day would not of itself be sufficient to predicate | a charge on the evidence submitted that money or anything of value bad been bet by I this defendant. The card with the writing is net even sufficient evidence in the opinion of the court to bring it under the provisions of the statute, which refers to bookmaking and the r gistration of a bet. because there is BO pro ;f that a bet had been made. Our Supreme Court has held that a bet or wager is a contract by which two or more I parties agree that a certain sum of money I or other thing of value shall be paid or delivered to one of them on the happening or , not happening of an uncertain event. 1nder this definition, a bet being a contract, it i3 essential that before there can be any conviction under our Gaming Act for the making or placing of a bet the evidence must show that two fir more people were of a common mind, that there was an offer and an accep- , tame and that the acceptance was actually or constructively communicated to the party making the offer. In this case there is no such evidence, nor any evidence which might tend to prove these essential elements of the contract, the only evidence being the card offered in evidence, unexplained, there being nothing to show its meaning. Th6 court cannot indulge in the presumption that the slip is the notation of a bet offered to be made by one whose initials it bears, nor in the piesumption that the initials represent the d-fendaiit in this case, and even if the court could so presume there would still rem tin the necessary elements unproved that of an acceptance of the offer. Before any conviction can be had. however, for gaming or betting, it must, as in any Other criminal cases, be proved beyond a reasonable dHibt. In this case the evidence does not prove the offense charged, and the defendant is, therefore, discharged. *

Persistent Link: https://drf.uky.edu/catalog/1920s/drf1924042001/drf1924042001_1_1
Local Identifier: drf1924042001_1_1
Library of Congress Record: https://lccn.loc.gov/unk82075800